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Abstract
In this note we present a cardinally convex game (Sharkey, 1981)
with empty core. Sharkey assumes that V (N) is convex, we do not do
so, hence we do not contradict Sharkey’s result.
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A cooperative game with non-transferable utility V (game for short) on a
non-empty, finite player set N is a family of sets V = {V (S)}S∈2N satisfying
the following assumptions:
V (∅) = ∅,
V (S) = V (S)S × RN\S, for all S ⊆ N,
0N ∈ V (S) for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
V (S) is closed for all S ⊆ N,
comprehensiveness: if x ∈ V (S), y ∈ RN , yS ≤ xS, then y ∈ V (S),
the sets V (S)S ∩ (xS + RS+) are bounded for all S ⊆ N and xS ∈ RS,
where SetS ⊆ RS is the coordinate projection of set Set by the coordinates
of S. Notice that we do not assume that V (N) is convex, so we are more
general than Sharkey (1981).
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The core of a game V ∈ GN consists of those elements x ∈ V (N) for which
it holds that there exist no S ⊆ N and no y ∈ V (S) such that xS  yS.
For a game V ∈ GN and a coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, let V ◦(S) = {x ∈
V (S) : xi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ S}, and let V ◦(∅) = {0N}. A game V ∈ GN is
cardinally convex (Sharkey, 1981) if for all S, T ⊆ N we have
V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) ⊆ V ◦(S ∪ T ) + V ◦(S ∩ T ) .
The following example is our main result.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, K = {{1, 2}, {3, 5}, {4, 6}}, and
V ({i}) = {x ∈ R6 : xi ≤ 0}, i ∈ N
V ({i, j}) =
{ {x ∈ R6 : ∃y ∈ [−10, 10], (xi, xj) ≤ (y,−y)}, if {i, j} ∈ K
{x ∈ R6 : xi, xj ≤ 0} otherwise
V ({i, j, k}) =
{ {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({i, j}) and xk ≤ 0}, if {i, j} ∈ K
{x ∈ R6 : xi, xj, xk ≤ 0} otherwise
V ({1, 2, 3, 4}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({1, 2}) ∩ V ({3, 4}) or x{1,2,3,4} ≤ (1, 1, 2, 2)}
V ({1, 2, 5, 6}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({1, 2}) ∩ V ({5, 6}) or x{1,2,5,6} ≤ (2, 2, 1, 1)}
V ({3, 4, 5, 6}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({3, 4}) ∩ V ({5, 6}) or x{3,4,5,6} ≤ (1, 1, 2, 2)}
V ({i, j, k, l}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({i, j}) ∩ V ({k, l})}, {i, j} ∈ K, {k, l} /∈ K
V ({i, j, k, l,m}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({i, j, k, l}) and xm ≤ 0}, {i, j}, {k, l} ∈ K
V ({i, j, k, l,m, n}) = {x ∈ R6 : x ∈ V ({i, j, k, l}) ∩ V ({m,n}) or ∃{g, h} ∈ K,
∃y ∈ R such that (xg, xh) ≤ (y − 1,−y100− sgn y − 1) and xN\{g,h} ≤ 100}
The game V is cardinally convex: Take coalitions S and T such that
neither S ⊆ T nor T ⊆ S, otherwise the proof is obvious. We discuss two
cases: First, there does not exist K ∈ K such that K ⊆ S ∩ T . Then
for each i ∈ S ∩ T either V (S)i ⊆ R− or V (T )i ⊆ R−. Furthermore, if
V (S)i ⊆ R−, then we can substitute V ◦(S \ {i}) for V ◦(S), and similarly if
V (T )i ⊆ R−, then we can substitute V ◦(T \ {i}) for V ◦(T ). Therefore, after
substituting as above we get two disjoint coalitions S∗ ⊆ S and T ∗ ⊆ T ,
where S∗ and T ∗ are the substitutes for S and T respectively. Then we have
V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) = V ◦(S∗) + V ◦(T ∗) ⊆ V ◦(S∗ ∪ T ∗) = V ◦(S ∪ T ).
Otherwise, let K ∈ K be a coalition that K ⊆ S ∩ T . If S ∪ T 6= N , then
|S ∩ T | ≤ 3, so there is only one K ∈ K such that K ⊆ S ∩ T .
If S ∩ T = K, then either |S| = 3 or |T | = 3. W.l.o.g. we can assume
that |S| = 3. Then for j ∈ S \ T , V (S)j ⊆ R−, hence V ◦(T ) + V ◦(S) ⊆
V ◦(T ∪ {j}) + V ◦(S \ {j}) = V ◦(S ∪ T ) + V ◦(S ∩ T ).
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If |S∩T | = 3, then for i ∈ (S∩T )\K either V (S)i ⊆ R− or V (T )i ⊆ R−.
W.l.o.g. we can assume that V (S)i ⊆ R−, then for j ∈ S \ T , j 6= i (actually
there is at most one such player), V (S)j ⊆ R− either. Then V ◦(T )+V ◦(S) ⊆
V ◦(T ∪ {j}) + V ◦(S \ {j}) = V ◦(S ∪ T ) + V ◦(S ∩ T ).
If S ∪ T = N , then for each x ∈ V (S) + V (T ), xK ≤ (4, 4) or xK /∈ R2+,
and xN\K ≤ 20N\K . Moreover, (6,−6), (−6, 6) ∈ V (K)K and there exist
y, z ∈ V (N) such that yK = (−2, 99), zK = (99,−2) and yN\K = zN\K =
100N\K , therefore V ◦(S) + V ◦(T ) ⊆ V (N) + V ◦(S ∩ T ).
The game V has empty core: If x ∈ V ({i, j, k, l}) ∩ V ({m,n}), then
either there exists g ∈ N such that xg < 0 or x{m.n} = 0{m,n}. In the
first case x is blocked via coalition {g}, in the second case x is blocked via
either coalition {1, 2, 3, 4} ({i, j, k, l} = {3, 4, 5, 6}) or coalition {1, 2, 5, 6}
({i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 3, 4}) or coalition {3, 4, 5, 6} ({i, j, k, l} = {1, 2, 5, 6}).
If there exist y ∈ R, {g, h} ∈ K such that (xg, xh) ≤ (y−1,−y100− sgn y−
1), then either xg < 0 or xh < 0, so x is blocked either via coalition {g} or
coalition {h}.
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